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Market-State or Commonwealth? 






The euro crisis is changing the foundations and finalities of the European Union. Amid the 
combined banking and sovereign debt crisis, eurozone members have begun to put in place a 
banking and a fiscal union that will fuse centralised state power with an increasingly 
interdependent single market. This ‘market-state’ disembeds the economy from society and 
re-embeds the social in the economic. As such, the European project blends bureaucratic 
collectivisation with commercial commodification that Catholic Social Teaching and cognate 
traditions in Anglicanism and Eastern Orthodoxy have rejected as false alternatives. 
Moreover, the centrally imposed single market and single currency – in their current 
configuration – undermine the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity, i.e. providing mutual 
assistance to the most needy among Europe’s peoples and nations as well as devolving power 
to the most appropriate level in accordance with the dignity of the person and human 
flourishing. 
Linked to the priority of the economic over the social is a tendency to subordinate 
interpersonal relationships to the central state and the ‘free’ market that collude at the 
expense of the intermediary institutions of civil society. Thus the European ‘market-state’ 
has undermined Europe’s shared cultural identity that Christianity helped forge. That, in turn, 
has hollowed out the universal values derived from the Christian synthesis of ancient and 
biblical virtues on which both vibrant democracies and market economies ultimately depend. 
At the same time, Europe remains a vestigially Christian polity that has the potential to be a 
commonwealth of nations and peoples, which is held together not just by economic exchange 
and political rights but also by cultural customs, social ties, ethical norms and religious 
practices. 
The essay will contrast the secular ‘market-state’ with a civic commonwealth. It will suggest 
that Europe’s Christian heritage is a source of both social solidarity and religious pluralism 
that offers key resources to shape the future of the European polity both at home and abroad. 
Section 1 traces the emergence of the ‘market-state’ and highlights its secular outlook. 
Section 2 links the rise of the ‘market-state’ to the EU’s current crisis, which is an 
unprecedented crisis of legitimacy. Section 3 outlines Europe’s emerging shape in terms of a 
multispeed EU and a multipolar Europe and explores the centrifugal forces that are 
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deepening divisions between the core and the periphery of the eurozone, between the euro 
area (and those aspiring to join it) and the rest of the EU as well as between the Union and 
the wider Europe. Section 4 contrast the EU’s evolution towards a ‘market-state’ with a civic 
commonwealth: whereas the former marks the transfer of powers to the centre under the 
guise of a federal model that in principle is supposed to provide a lock on centralisation, the 
latter is a voluntary association of nations and peoples with a shared social imaginary that 
can provide popular assent and address the legitimacy crisis. In conclusion, I suggest that the 
EU remains a vestigially Christian polity whose indebtedness to Christianity provides 
resources to help re-embed states and markets in the mediating, interpersonal relations of 
civil society and to integrate other faiths communities in a shared public realm that 
transcends the false divide between the purely religious and the exclusively secular. 
 
1. The Secular ‘Market-State’ 
 
Across Europe and elsewhere there is an implicit, inchoate awareness that big government 
and big business have colluded at the expense of the people. Both central bureaucratic states 
and unbridled markets are disembedded from civil society, and civil society is subordinated to 
the global secular ‘market-state’.1 This convergence of state and market can be described as 
secular because it subjects human relationships, civic ties, and social bonds to abstract values 
and standards, such as commercial exchange or centralised regulation. This subjects the 
sanctity of life and land to the combined power of state and market and thereby threatens the 
autonomy of civil society and faith groups. 
Far from being purely accidental, this evolution can be traced to a wider set of structural shifts 
that have changed the behaviour of individuals, companies, and states. After 1945, Europe 
and the USA adopted an economic model that the American theorist John Gerald Ruggie has 
described as ‘embedded liberalism’.2 This model aimed at achieving full employment and 
social welfare at home through regulated international trade, managed exchange rates and 
controlled capital flows abroad. Within the framework of sovereign national states, 
governments were committed to provide public investment and a basic safety net for the 
unemployed, the sick, and all those unable to help themselves. 
                                                        
1 On the notion of the ‘market-state’, see Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles. War, Peace and the Course of 
History (London: Penguin, 2003), pp. 213-42; Andrew Gamble, ‘Two faces of neo-liberalism’, in Richard 
Robison (ed.), The Neo-liberal Revolution: forging the market state (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 
pp. 20-35; Adrian Pabst, ‘The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy’, Telos No. 152 (Fall 2010): 44-67. 
2 John Gerald Ruggie, ‘International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar 
economic order’, in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1983), pp. 195-223. 
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Since the breakdown of this Keynesian settlement in the 1970s, national states have been 
supplanted by ‘market-states’ that seek to maximize client and consumer choice by opening 
up virtually all levels of the national economy to global finance and free trade. The 
concomitant shift in sovereignty from an international system of nation-states to a global 
order of ‘market-states’ coincided with a structural transformation of the world economy and 
global governance – the post-1945 Bretton Woods settlement of fixed exchange rates, 
regulated trade, and capital controls gave way to the post-1971 emphasis on floating exchange 
rates, free trade (e.g. the European single market or NAFTA), and ever-higher capital 
mobility.3 This transformation has further weakened the capacity of sovereign states to 
insulate their domestic democratic processes from international economic developments or 
supranational arrangements in the case of the EU. It goes a long way towards explaining both 
the impact of financial globalisation and the popular reactions against its ensuing economic 
devastation and social dislocation. 
But far from undermining state sovereignty as a whole, governments are increasingly 
integrated into a global system of economic and political governance. That system centres on 
‘market-states’, multinational corporations, international organisations such as the IMF, the 
World Bank or GATT/WTO as well as supranational bodies like the EU or in a less structured 
way the G8/G20. States remain central to the exercise of sovereign power, as they retain the 
prerogative to negotiate and implement international agreements, laws, and regulations within 
their respective jurisdictions. Crucially, the executive branch of government – together with 
the higher echelons of central state administrations and a new class of supranational judges 
and arbitration courts – has concentrated power in its hand at the expense of the national 
legislature, the national judiciary and the national electorate. There is thus a lack of 
accountability, legitimacy, and popular participation at both the national and the supranational 
the level. That is compounded by a process of ‘self-corruption’, as a democratically elected 
executive will claim the legitimate authority to exceed its own mandate in the face of 
circumstances, which could not be anticipated by that mandate and which the electorate 
cannot vote on – including supranational decisions. Paradoxically, the dominant pillars of 
global governance have widened the gap between domestic democratic institutions and 
international economic decision-making, while at the same reinforcing the dependence of 
everyday market economies upon transnational capital.  
In this manner, ‘market-states’ provide the conduit through which political sovereignty and 
economic transactions are conflated with each other and gradually abstracted from the social                                                         
3 See Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, 2nd ed. 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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relations and civic bonds in which they were traditionally embedded. Indeed, ‘market-states’ 
do not fit into the binary poles of the political left versus the political right or the institutional 
poles of the state versus the market that have been dominant since the American and the 
French Revolution. Rather, they are characterised by a series of paradoxes – combining, first 
of all, a strong state with a unfettered market; second, centralised authority with dwindling 
power; third, greater popular demands with less civic mobilization and participation; fourth, 
less welfare with more state protection against risk. As Philip Bobbitt rightly remarks,  
the market-state will live within three paradoxes: (1) it will require more centralized 
authority for government, but all governments will be weaker […] (2) there will be 
more public participation in government, but it will count for less, and thus the role 
of the citizen qua citizen will greatly diminish and the role of citizen as spectator will 
increase; (3) the welfare state will have greatly retrenched, but infrastructure 
security, epidemiological surveillance, and environmental protection – all of which 
are matters of general welfare – will be promoted by the State as never before. These 
three paradoxes derive from the shift in the basis of legitimacy from that of the 
nation-state to that of the market-state.4 
 
Here one can go further than Bobbitt and other contemporary theorists and suggest that the 
‘market-state’ marks a distinctly secular arrangement. The reason is threefold. First of all, it 
promotes an increasing centralisation of power and concentration of wealth at the expense of 
local government, small- and medium-sized businesses (that are often family owned), and the 
autonomy of civil society as a whole. As such, the power of states and markets transgresses 
the civic and ethical limits that have been defended by different religious traditions. Second, 
the ‘market-state’ invests the secular sphere of power and wealth with quasi-sacred 
significance by sacralising either politics or economics, and often both at once. For example, 
the primacy of rights and contracts over social bonds and civic ties tends to subordinate both 
theological and civil virtues to the spirit of acquisitiveness and the commercial society. Third, 
the ‘market-state’ subsumes the sanctity of life and land under the secular sacrality of power 
and wealth; one can argue that the secular settlement of the global ‘market-state’ risks 
profaning the sacred and sacralising the profane. 
 
2. Europe’s Current Crisis 
 
The euro is not the sole cause of the Union’s current crisis. It has rather extended and 
reinforced the deterministic logic of neo-functionalism that underpins the entire European 
edifice set up by the 1957 Rome Treaty, notably the neo-functionalist idea that economic 
                                                        
4 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, pp. 234-5. 
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cooperation ‘spills over’ into political integration.5 The project of creating a banking, fiscal 
and political union currently under discussion by the 17 eurozone members is in large part an 
expression of the same economic determinism that led to the single market and the single 
currency in the first place. Instead of a reciprocal recognition of diverse and mutually 
augmenting practices, neo-functionalism has tended to impose centrally determined, abstract 
standards on all member-states and candidate countries through top-down legal and regulatory 
harmonisation driven forward by the European Commission in concert with the European 
Court of Justice. This has produced a kind of bureaucratic and managerialist homogenisation 
that is at odds with the purported aim of securing Europe’s unity-in-diversity (in varietate 
concordia). With its focus on economic integration, the  functionalist approach is compatible 
with methods that are variously more intergovernmental or more supranational and with 
models that either favour a federal super-state or a free-trade area – or, in the case of the 
single market and the single currency, both at once. 
Accordingly, neo-functionalism has produced an increasingly interdependent European 
economy which is ever more disconnected from each national polity and society. The 
founding principles of solidarity and subsidiairity – which Europe inherited from the 
Christian Catholic fusion of Greco-Roman Antiquity with biblical revelation – might have 
been enshrined in successive treaties. But in recent decades the EU has further retreated 
towards narrow national self-interest, centralisation and a concentration of power and wealth. 
Linked to this is the progressive evolution towards unilateral rights without responsibilities 
and commercial contracts devoid of any social purpose, which have supplanted and 
undermined the civic ties and social bonds that hold together nations and peoples. Rather than 
commanding the assent of its people and offering the possibility for civic participation in a 
shared polity, the Union has fused elements of state collectivism with market 
commodification – a secular ‘market-state’ that disembeds the economy from society and re-
embeds the social in the economic, as I have already indicated. As a by-product of economic 
and legal standardisation, the EU’s political structures lack firm foundations and finalities. 
For these reasons, the current turmoil in the eurozone intensifies and radicalises a very 
profound political crisis. Pascal Lamy puts this well: 
The euro crisis shows that Europe’s institutions of political integration do not 
correspond to the economic integration that has been built. This imbalance is not                                                         
5 On neo-functionalism, see – inter alia – Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic 
Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958); David Mitrany, ‘The Prospect of European 
Integration: Federal or Functional’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 4, no. 2 (June 1965): 119-149; 
Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘European Integration and Supranational Governance’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 4 (1997): 297-317; Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz, and Neil Fligstein (eds.), 
The Institutionalization of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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sustainable, and new forms of discipline, solidarity and legitimacy have to 
emerge. The euro crisis is actually three crises: one economic, one institutional 
and one of legitimacy. The economic component is the symptom – a dangerous 
combination of a lack of competitiveness, fiscal problems and shaky banks. The 
institutional component reflects the original sins in the design of the Monetary 
Union – Europe’s insufficient central powers in supervision, resolution and risk-
sharing that subsequent constitutional reforms have failed to address. Lastly, the 
euro is also plagued by a legitimacy crisis in which support for the common 
currency – and, more broadly, for the European project – is in decline.6  
 
The Franco-German strategy of introducing federalism through the backdoor has failed. 
Originally federalism was designed to limit centralisation, not to promote it. At the same time, 
Europe is suffering a crisis of legitimacy that goes far beyond the well-known (but poorly 
understood) ‘democratic deficit’. Every system of representation is in ‘deficit’ compared with 
the rigorous standards of democracy and representative government, not least political 
systems at the national level. This is not the same as a crisis of legitimacy, which concerns the 
lack of public trust and popular assent. Legitimate rule transcends formal arrangements and 
procedures such as clear constitutional settlements or periodic elections. It rests on three core 
capacities: (i) the ability to make a political system intelligible to its members; (ii) the ability 
to mobilise civic consent; (iii) the ability to interest and even to entertain citizens. The EU 
falls short on all three levels. 
More specifically, there is an increasing institutional risk that national parliaments and the 
European Parliament will unwittingly succeed in discrediting each other, as Larry Siedentop 
has argued.7 The reason is that the increased powers of the EP are not counterbalanced by its 
enhanced authority. By contrast, national parliaments retain authority but have less and less 
power. The widening discrepancy between power and authority constitutes a very dangerous 
dialectic that is gradually eroding the remaining popular support for European integration. 
Under pressure from political parties and the media to defend the national interest, 
governments convening as part of EU ministerial meetings seem increasingly unable to come 
up with decisions that can command consent. In turn, this creates a growing gap between 
Europe’s ruling elites and its citizenry. This, coupled with the end of a binary ideological 
contest and the triumph of a vacuously centrist pragmatism, helps account for the recent 
upsurge in support for the extreme right that occupies the vacuum. Thus Europe is in need of 
a political project that can shape political debate and reconnect political classes to popular 
sentiment and public opinion alike. The Union’s crisis of legitimacy predates the eurozone 
                                                        
6 Pascal Lamy, ‘Europe needs a legitimacy compact’, International Herald Tribune, 9 July 2012, available 
online http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/opinion/europe-needs-a-legitimacy-compact.html?_r=0 
7 Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe, new ed. (London: Penguin, 2001). 
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turmoil and has been developing for at least twenty-five years – ever since the acceleration of 
the European integration and enlargement process following the fall of Communism and 
German reunification. 
Crucially, the EU lacks what Charles Taylor calls a ‘social imaginary’, i.e. “[…] ways people 
imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between 
them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative 
notions and images that underline these expectations”. According to Taylor, a social 
imaginary “is in fact that largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole 
situation, within which particular features of our world show up for us in the sense they have. 
It can never be adequately expressed in the form of explicit doctrines because of its unlimited 
and indefinite nature”.8 Accordingly, a social imaginary shapes the way those people who 
share it view their co-existence, notably the normative dimensions of individual or collective 
hope and the mutual expectations that citizens have vis-à-vis each other. As such, social 
imaginaries involve common narratives, myths and practices, particularly how people behave 
towards one another. Beyond the ‘democratic deficit’, the EU faces a crisis of legitimacy and 
lacks a pan-European consciousness – a European social imaginary that is missing from the 
social imaginary of most EU member-states and their engagement with the Union. 
As Charles Taylor suggests, the theory of social imaginaries must conform to the reality, i.e. 
popular experience and assent to political rule – whether through constitutional settlements, in 
elected assemblies or other forms such as faith communities. After all, the parish remains the 
most primary administrative and cultural unit around which local communities organise and 
people associate. Now that the reality of social imaginaries has changed, the theory neither 
describes nor explains the experience of Europe’s citizens. The EU used to have an 
‘imagined’ social imaginary that rested on mutual market interest, state welfare and the 
peculiarly European social models. But the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the post-1945 era no 
longer captures the reality that most European citizens inhabit and face on a daily basis, 
except perhaps Northern Europeans. Linked to this is the danger of deconstructing not just the 
nation-state but also national identity and failing in the attempt to build the first transnational 
political community in history. 
Indeed, one side-effect of the European project since 1957 has been to weaken the nation-
state and to replace it with another kind of state, which has been variously described as a 
‘market-state’ or a transnational state.9 In the case of Europe, the ‘market-state’ is                                                         
8 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), pp. 23-25. 
9 See Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century, 2nd ed. (London: 
Atlantic Books, 2007). 
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characterised by three distinct features. First of all, it delinks the state from the nation and 
transforms the purpose of government from pursuing the public good to managing systemic 
risk – whether financial, economic, environmental or physical. Second, it undermines the 
social contract between the state and the citizen in favour of different social contracts with 
distinct groups (whether ethnic communities or professional groups like bankers). As such, 
the citizenry as a whole lacks cohesion and identity. Third, it seeks to replace national myths 
and narratives with supranational substitutes. In short, the EU is suffering a crisis of 
legitimacy that takes the form of a crisis in social capital, i.e. a growing lack of trust between 
citizens and the state. At the same time, the Community institutions are not alone: countries at 
the core and in periphery are in the midst of a democratic crisis too, with austerity hitting 
ordinary people disproportionately hard and sacrifices not being shared properly by all 
sections of the population. Moreover, countries such as Latvia, Hungary and Romania are 
disqualifying themselves from being members of the club because their nominally liberal 
democracies are becoming increasingly illiberal and undemocratic. In short, the Union as a 
whole faces an unprecedented crisis of representation and legitimacy, and the citizens 
recognise it more acutely – albeit inchoately – than do the ruling elites in Brussels or in 
national capitals. 
Herein lies the reason for political extremism and popular alienation from the European 
project. The breakdown of national social imaginaries is the source for radicalisation on both 
the left and the right, chief of all the excesses of multiculturalism and post-national 
citizenship whereby foreign minority claims seem to take precedence over indigenous 
majority interests. As a result, growing numbers of citizens across Europe question 
representative democracy and the institutions of both state and market that collude with 
special interests at the expense of ordinary people. But since there is no widely shared 
European social imaginary or European citizenship, people end up rallying around the nation-
state and national myths (or populist versions that are filling the ideological void). Without a 
proper democratic mandate, neither national governments or the supranational decision-
making bodies of the EU will be able to command popular assent and address the legitimacy 
crisis that threatens the post-war European project as a whole. 
 
3. The Emerging Shape of Europe 
 
The euro crisis is accelerating and intensifying the emergence of a multi-speed EU and multi-
polar Europe that can be traced to the post-1989 era and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Coupled 
with the failure to implement the 1990 Paris Charter and overcome the Cold War opposition 
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between the West and Russia, the three-pillar system that was enshrined in the European 
treaty introduced a division into the newly established Union. Crucially, the EU did not build 
the right institutions to translate its political ambition into reality and transform the neo-
functionalist logic at the heart of the integration process. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
subsequent enlargement waves and treaty revisions failed to stop the rise of the European 
‘market-state’ by building a proper polity that reflects the EU’s diverse societies and can 
embed the increasingly interdependent national economies. 
However, one fundamental difference between the post-1989 era and the post-2009 years is 
that the ongoing turmoil in the eurozone has shifted the dynamic from the centripetal forces 
that unified the Union between 1957 and the early 1990s to the centrifugal forces that risk 
dividing it now in three ways: first, between the core and the peripheral countries within the 
euro area; second, between the euro members (and euro candidates such as Poland and the 
other ‘euro-plus countries’) and the rest of the EU (especially the UK); third, between EU 
member-states, candidate/access countries and the ‘European non-West’ (including Russia, 
Ukraine and the wider Europe that extends to the greater Caucasus, parts of the Middle East 
and North Africa). 
In relation to the emerging eurozone arrangements, it is already clear that the proposed project 
of creating a banking, a fiscal and a political union fails to resolve the economic problems of 
the current crisis and the constitutional deficiencies that successive treaty revision have not 
addressed. The combined banking and sovereign debt disaster since 2009/9 is in large part the 
outcome of a balance of payments of crisis associated with long-standing trade imbalances 
between surplus countries at the core (chief of all Germany) and deficit countries in the 
periphery (mostly Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain but less so Italy). These imbalances are 
linked to significant differences in competitiveness and productivity. In turn, competitiveness 
and productivity differentials are exacerbated by private and public sector investment within 
and across eurozone countries and EU member-states, including incentives to channel surplus 
capital (from the global ‘savings glut’ accumulated by emerging markets) into specific sectors 
such as finance, insurance and real estate (or FIRE). Fuelled by low interest rates and no 
exchange rate uncertainty, the single currency accelerated and amplified the divergence 
between the real, productive investment economy of the core and the speculative finance 
economy of the periphery. The banking union may help deal with banking debt and the fiscal 
union might limit unsustainable budget deficits, but both merely treat the symptoms of a 
wider structural crisis of booms, bubbles, busts and bailouts that the single currency has 
exacerbated but did not create. 
  10 
Likewise, the emerging arrangements within the eurozone risk deepening the divisions with 
the non-euro members such as the UK, Denmark or Hungary. First of all, the proposed 
banking union has the potential to weaken the financial system of the euro area as well as the 
City of London by widening the gap between them, e.g. by restricting non-EU financial firms 
based in the UK to do business across the eurozone. The provisions aimed at centralising 
supervision and extending supranational control to deposit insurance and resolution regimes 
also lack the necessary regional and sectoral flexibility to counteract the formation of banking 
conglomerates that carry systemic risk.  
Second, the fiscal union – in its currently conceived configuration – will concentrate decision-
making on national budgets in the hands of the Commission in ways that could either clash 
with the interests of non-euro members or undermine the common rules of the single market 
(or both at once). The fiscal union could lead to new institutions such as a joint assembly of 
national parliamentarians and MEPs that could weaken the unity of certain Community 
bodies such as the European Parliament. As Charles Grant has suggested, those EU member-
states that will stay outside the euro “do not wish to give up any more economic sovereignty. 
They will, however, wish to remain involved in the single market, trade policy, farm policy, 
foreign policy co-operation and other things that the EU does. A key question is whether the 
eurozone and perhaps the eurozone-plus countries develop institutions that are distinct from 
those of the EU. If they think their interests are different to those of the [non-euro] tier, they 
may. If the eurozone develops special secretariats or parliaments with lawmaking powers, it 
could adopt rules that clash with those of the EU, fracturing the single market”.10  
Crucially, the UK position of seeking to repatriate powers and securing opt-outs will 
undermine the unity of the single market guaranteed by the Commission, the EP and the ECJ 
because any special deal for Britain is likely to be rejected by other member-states, which 
would lead to a UK veto of a new treaty and thus another extra-Community treaty 
arrangement among the rest – just like the fiscal compact. But the difference would that the 
new non-EU treaty is likely to entail new institutions for coordinating the economic polices of 
its signatories, which would create legal and regulatory divergence across the single market. 
Paradoxically, the very institutions that can prevent the fragmentation of the single economic 
space – chief of all the Commission and the ECJ – favour the centralisation of power that 
characterises the European ‘market-state’. 
In short, the euro crisis marks the failure of the latest attempt to construct or sustain a 
monetary union without a coherent political union that defines the distribution of powers                                                         
10 Charles Grant, ‘A three-tier EU puts single market at risk’, Financial Times 26 October 2012. 
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according to the twin Christian Catholic principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. Amid the 
centrifugal forces of division, debt and demoralisation, the eurozone countries face a 
fundamental choice between two kinds of federalism: either a German or US-style federal 
model with a substantial budget and a permanent transfer of actual, financial ‘fire power’ to 
the centre, including the welfare state (i.e. a ‘transfer union’); or else “a fiscal federation by 
exception” (in the words of the former ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet) that gives the 
supranational level powers of control and intrusion whenever individual national budget 
deficits and debt levels threaten the euro area as a whole.11 The latter constitutes an apparently 
more decentralised model than a permanent transfer of power to the centre. But in reality it 
obeys a far more centralising logic than the former, which allocates power clearly among the 
various levels and grants national (or sub-regional) components a far greater degree of 
autonomy to administer their affairs. 
However, even such a classical form of federalism seems politically unpalatable to most 
eurozone countries, including Germany and France. One reason is that the rise of the ‘market-
state’ at the national and at the European level has helped dissolve the social bonds and civic 
ties on which functioning democracies and economies depend. The principle of solidarity 
involves a measure of mutual sacrifice, which is the only way of overcoming Europe’s 
economic, political and ethical crisis. The trouble is that the various European countries 
cannot ask their citizens to make sacrifices as long as there is a crisis of legitimacy. Arguably 
it is true that the EU has helped create a sense of Europe but no shared European identity or 
consciousness that can translate into social bonds or civic ties – in short, no shared social 
imaginary. 
All the present proposals that are on offer to resolve the current crisis are structures which 
lack legitimacy and fail to mobilise citizens into making the necessary sacrifices. For 
example, the two proposed solutions to the economic crisis are either austerity or a stimulus 
fiscal, but governments cannot demand from their citizens the necessary national sacrifices 
under a European diktat of austerity or a retrenchment of the welfare state – or indeed both at 
once. Strong growth in the eurozone and the rest of the EU requires stable public finances and 
a profound transformation of the various European social models that are all economically 
unsustainable. As long as the Union does not defend and promote the kind of social bonds, 
civic ties and cultural links that bind citizens together, the nations that compose the Union 
                                                        
11 Jean-Claude Trichet, ‘Lessons from the Crisis: Challenges for the Advanced Economies and for the European 
Monetary Union’, Eleventh Annual Niarchos Lecture, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC, 17 May 2012, available online at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/transcript-
20120518niarchos-trichet.pdf  
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will share little more than the economic rights of the single market. A polity based on mass 
consumption instead of a shared social imaginary will not command the assent of its people. 
 
4. Europe’s Civic Commonwealth: an alternative vision for the future 
 
To build a proper polity that can transform the European market-state, the Union needs to 
address three fundamental errors. First of all, the primacy of economic integration over 
political union, which has led to a market-state that is disembedded from society and a 
citizenry that is subordinated to the joint rule of the economic and the political. Second, the 
premature process of constitutionalisation that culminated in the rejection of the 2005 
Constitutional Treaty and the flawed Lisbon Treaty. Third, the current institutional 
arrangements that concentrate power in the hands of supranational institutions and national 
governments at the expense of the Union’s citizenry. What underpins these three errors are 
the two dominant methods of integration and enlargement, namely the supranational 
Community method (that rests on the logic of neo-functionalism) and the intergovernmental 
method (that is grounded in the logic of liberal institutionalism).  
The former imposes an EU constitutional and institutional settlement from above, while the 
latter denies the import of constitutional norms and reduces cooperation to largely technical 
transactions. Both approaches favour formal, procedural values and process over above 
substantive notions and policy. That is why the EU is associated with abstract standards and 
top-down harmonisation that brackets the plural search for the common good, human 
flourishing and the dignity of the person altogether out of the picture. So both crude 
federalism, which is based on the supranational Community method, and narrow 
‘sovereignism’, which draws on the intergovernmental method, are unable to bring about a 
proper polity that can blend unity with diversity by upholding universal principles which are 
embodied in particular practices. On the contrary, the dominant models and methods continue 
to fuel the centrifugal forces that exacerbate both integration and enlargement fatigue and risk 
breaking the Union asunder. 
By contrast, Europe’s diverse Christian heritage has the potential to renew and extend the 
shared social imaginary on which a vibrant market economy and democracy depend. In a 
remarkable report on “The Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe” published in 2004, a 
reflection group composed of European statesmen and intellectuals debunked the neo-
functional myth that economic integration will lead to political union and that market forces 
can produce politically resilient solidarity: “The original expectation, that the political unity 
of the EU would be a consequence of the European common market has proven to be illusory 
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[…] To function as a viable and vital polity, the European Union needs a firmer 
foundation”.12 Rightly rejecting any arbitrary list of abstract values, the group argued that the 
role of Europe’s common culture, which is a variety of traditions that are both intertwined and 
in tension with one another, grows in significance as the old, secular logic of integration 
unravels. Crucially, the shared cultural bonds, which bind Europeans together, draw on the 
Christian fusion of biblical revelation with Greco-Roman Antiquity in order to promote 
notions such as peace, reconciliation, solidarity and subsidiarity. 
Moreover, Christianity has bequeathed to Europe and the rest of the world a number of 
perennial principles such as the dignity of the person, the virtue of free association and the 
distinction of religious from political authority that avoids both aggressive secularism 
(masquerading as secular neutrality) and fanatical theocracy (masquerading as religious 
guidance). In the absence of such and similar principles, all the contemporary profession of 
values associated with democracy and liberalism will sound increasingly hollow. Indeed, the 
professed pragmatism of many European elites masks a dangerous moral relativism, as Pope 
Benedict XVI has argued: 
A community built without respect for the true dignity of the human being, 
disregarding the fact that every person is created in the image of God ends up 
doing no good to anyone. For this reason it seems ever more important that 
Europe be on guard against the pragmatic attitude, widespread today, which 
systematically justifies compromise on essential human values, as if it were the 
inevitable acceptance of a lesser evil. This kind of pragmatism, even when 
presented as balanced and realistic, is in reality neither, since it denies the 
dimension of values and ideals inherent in human nature. When non-religious and 
relativistic tendencies are woven into this pragmatism, Christians as such are 
eventually denied the very right to enter into the public discussion, or their 
contribution is discredited as an attempt to preserve unjustified privileges. In this 
historical hour and faced with the many challenges that confront it, the European 
Union, in order to be a valid guarantor of the rule of law and an efficient promoter 
of universal values, cannot but recognize clearly the certain existence of a stable 
and permanent human nature, source of common rights for all individuals, 
including those who deny them. In this context, the right to conscientious 
objection should be protected, every time fundamental human rights are 
violated.13 
 
Therefore universal values and principles like freedom, equality, solidarity and the will of the 
majority require firm foundations and transcendent finalities that mediate between the 
individual and the collective – otherwise liberal democracy slides either into moral relativism                                                         
12 Reflection Group, ‘The Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe’, Vienna/Brussels October 2004, available 
online at http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/michalski_281004_final_report_en.pdf, p. 6.  
13 Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Participants in the Congress promoted by the Commission of the Bishops’ 
Conferences of the European Community (COMECE) on the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, 24th 
March 2007, online at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2007/march/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20070324_comece_en.html  
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or political absolutism  (or indeed both at once). The Union needs to eschew abstract 
standards, formal values and the priority of process over policy in favour of a mutual 
recognition of particular practices, universal principles such as the common good and the 
primacy of both constitutionalism and mixed government (rather than liberal market 
democracy). 
Up to a point, Europe remains a vestigially Christian polity that reflects the mediated 
universalism of Christianity’s fusion of biblical revelation with Greco-Roman Antiquity. 
Indeed, Europe’s polity is characterised by hybrid institutions, overlapping jurisdictions, 
polycentric authority and multi-level governance that are different from the characteristically 
ancient or modern concentration of power in the hands of a sovereign – whether an absolute 
monarch and a revolutionary republic. Drawing in part on the work of Rémi Brague, Cardinal 
Angelo Scola has remarked that the origins of this distinctly European model go back to a 
long tradition which views Europe not as foundational but rather as the continuous unfolding 
of the Hellenistic fusion of Jerusalem with Athens.14 In the ‘long Middle Ages’ (c500-1300), 
Hellenised Christianity integrated and transformed other European traditions such Germanic 
law or the Celtic language.  
Connected with this blending of diverse cultures within an overarching framework is the 
Judeo-Christian distinction of religious from political authority. Based on this distinction, a 
free ‘complex space’ emerged between political rule and society wherein politics is not 
monopolised by the state but pertains to the public realm in which individuals and groups 
participate.15 Indeed, the Church – together with local communities and professional bodies 
like guilds or universities – tended to defend the freedom of society against political coercion. 
It thereby helped protect the autonomy of Jewish, Muslim and other religious minorities. In 
addition to complex debates about the relative balance of state and church or the ‘mix’ of 
different sources of law (canon, common and civil), the presence of Jewish communities and 
Muslim-ruled lands on the Iberian peninsula ensured that ‘Christian Europe’ at its best was 
never a clerically dominated monolith but rather a realm of political argument within and 
across different faith traditions. Just like Christianity was never purely European, so too 
Europe is not an exclusively ‘Christian club’. 
                                                        
14 Cardinal Angelo Scola, ‘The Christian contribution the European Integration Process’, lecture delivered in 
Cracow, 10 September 2010, available online at http://english.angeloscola.it/2010/10/07/the-christian-
contribution-to-the-european-integration-process/; Rémi Brague, L’Europe, la voie romaine, revised ed. (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1999); see also Sylvain Gouguenheim, Aristote au Mont Saint-Michel: Les racines grecques de 
l’Europe chrétienne (Paris: Editions Seuil, 2008). 
15 John Milbank, ‘On Complex Space’, in idem, The Word Made Strange. Theology, language, culture (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997), pp. 268-292. 
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Moreover, Christendom in East and West has blended the principle of free association in 
Germanic common law with the Latin sense of equity and participation in the shared civitas. 
In this manner, European Christianity has defended a more relational account (in terms of 
objective rights and reciprocal duties, not merely subjective individual entitlements) that 
outflanked the dialectic of the individual and the collective that we owe to the American and 
the French Revolution. Ultimately, Europe’s unique legacy of faith and reason provided the 
basis for European claims to an ‘organically’ plural universalism. The mark of this variant of 
universalism is that it avoids both moral relativism and political absolutism by offering a free, 
shared social space for religious and non-religious practice – the ‘realm’ of civil society that 
is more primary than either the central state or the ‘free’ market. As the ‘corporation of 
corporations’, the European polity rests on common civic culture and social bonds that are 
more fundamental than either formal constitutional-legal rights or economic-contractual ties 
(or some sinister fusion of both). 
So what sets Europe apart from the other global ‘poles’ is the autonomous space of civil 
society and the intermediary institutions that mediate between the individual, the state and the 
market. The aforementioned report by the Reflection Group on the spiritual and cultural 
dimension of Europe puts this well:  
Europe itself is far more than a political construct. It is a complex – a "culture" – 
of institutions, ideas, expectations, habits and feelings, moods, memories and 
prospects that form a "glue" binding Europeans together – and all these are a 
foundation on which a political construct must rest. This complex – we can speak 
of it as European civil society – is at the heart of political identity. It defines the 
conditions of successful European politics and the limits of state and political 
intervention.16 
 
Contrary to common misconceptions, the EU is neither a federal super-state nor an 
intergovernmental structure. Instead, European nations pool their sovereignty and are more 
like ‘super-regions’ within a pan-national polity that combines a political system sui generis 
with elements of a neo-medieval empire.17 The German constitutional court, in a landmark 
ruling on the Lisbon Treaty in June 2009, emphasized that the Union is neither just an 
international organisation nor a federal super-state but rather a voluntary association of states 
– unlike the USA since the civil war. The mark of the European polity is that it limits both 
state and market power in favour of communities and groups. This associational model 
combines vertical, more hierarchical elements with horizontal, more egalitarian aspects, with                                                         
16 Reflection Group, ‘The Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe’, p. 9. 
17 Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Jan 
Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
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overlapping jurisdictions and a complex web of intermediary institutions wherein sovereignty 
is dispersed and diffused. By contrast, the US is a commercial republic where civil society is 
equated with proprietary relations and market-based exchange.18 In other parts of the world, 
civil society is subordinated to the administrative and symbolic order of central state power. 
Thus, Europe’s greatest ‘gift’ to its people and the rest of the world is to offer a narrative that 
accentuates the autonomy of associations vis-à-vis both state and market and re-embeds both 
politics and economics within the civic and social bonds of civil society.  
Amid the current crisis of legitimacy, this suggests that the EU needs a better model of shared 
sovereignty and reciprocal power by building a subsidiary polis that connects supranational 
institutions much more closely to regions, localities, communities and neighbourhood. In turn, 
this requires a much greater sense of a common demos with a mutual ethos and telos. In line 
with its own best traditions, Europe could do worse than to renew and extend its political 
project around the following principles and practices. First of all, a commonwealth of nations 
and peoples rather than a market-state of ‘big government’ and ‘big business’. Second, the 
pursuit of the common good in which all can share – beyond the maximisation of individual 
utility or collective happiness (or both at once). Third, a series of political transformations 
that not only acknowledge the recent failures and the current crisis but also reconfigure the 
key institutions in accordance with Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman notions of constitution 
rule and ‘mixed government’. 
More specifically, one of the clearest weaknesses of the EU’s political system is established 
modality of direct elections to the EP, which has broken the link between national political 
classes and the European project, giving national politicians and national parliaments an 
excuse to get involved less than they should do and might otherwise have done. Linked to this 
is another structural weakness, namely the evolution of the Commission from being a pan-
European civil service in support of national governments towards a supranational institution 
that concentrates both legislative and executive powers in its own hands. Both EP elections 
and the designation of the Commission drive a wedge between EU and national politics and 
deepen the growing gap between the Union and its citizenry.  
For these reasons, the EU should create a parliamentary system of bicameralism – with a 
lower house representing the people and an upper house representing cities, regions, nations, 
professions and faiths. For its part, the Commission should revert to being a high-level 
European civil service that supports the work of the EU’s bicameral legislature and the EU’s 
executive – the Council of Ministers and the European Council (and possibly nationally                                                         
18 See Adrian Pabst, ‘Athens, Rome, and Jerusalem – A reply to Luciano Pellicani’, Telos no. 162 (Spring 2013), 
pp. 164-176. 
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elected politicians on secondment to the EU to ensure the day-to-day running of the EU’s 
executive). In this manner, a bicameral system and an executive rooted in national polities can 
once again bind national political classes to the European project. The objection that the EU 
already has a certain kind of second chamber in the form of the Council of Ministers ignores 
its role, which is to relate the European project to national governments but not to national 
parliaments and national polities in the manner that is needed. 
Crucially, a bicameral parliament and the participation of nationally elected politicians in the 
EU executive would go some ways towards building a mixed government that is in line with 
the best traditions of European constitutionalism – notably the rule of law, limits on sovereign 
power, the interplay of the ‘one’, the ‘few’ and the ‘many’ as well as the distinction of powers 
without however an absolute separation (as in revolutionary regimes of the USA and France), 
which ends either in paralysis or in the primacy of the executive over the other branches of 
government (again as in the USA and France). What a proper European polity requires is a 
much stronger measure of popular assent, coupled with civic participation (through local, 
regional and professional assemblies like town-halls or guildhalls) and the guidance of ‘the 
wise’ (based on the representation of faiths and professions). Only a commonwealth of 
nations and peoples with some shared social imaginary will be able to embed markets and 
states in the interpersonal relationships of trust and cooperation on which social ties and civic 
bonds ultimately rest. 
Externally, a commonwealth that reflects the mediating universalism of the Judeo-Christian 
and Greco-Roman tradition would contrast with the exceptionalism of old empires and new 
colonial powers such as the USA, China as well as (to a lesser extent) Russia and some newly 
emerging markets such as Indonesia. However imperfectly, the EU remains so far the only 
serious attempt to build the first transnational political community whose members come 
together to form a voluntary association of nations that pool some of their sovereign power 
for the common good of their people and others across the globe. Europe has a terrible 
colonial history, but it has also given rise to a set of institutions and practices that have 
transformed tribalism and nationalism at home and abroad.  
Indeed, Europe has shaped global history not through sheer size or military might but rather 
thanks to its inventiveness and the creation of force multipliers, as Christopher Coker has 
argued.19 European inventiveness today is mirrored in the international order that reflects 
Europe’s Christian heritage. For example, European Protestant theologians and Catholic 
figures played a decisive role in creating the League of Nations after 1919 and the United                                                         
19 Christopher Coker, ‘Rebooting the West: The US, Europe and the Future of the Western Alliance’, Royal 
United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), Whitehall Paper 72, 6 Nov 2009. 
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Nations in 1946. Christian Democrats from Italy, Germany, the Benelux countries and even 
France led the way in setting up the project for European integration and enlargement in the 
late 1940s and 1950s. They were inspired by Christian social teaching which, since the 
ground-breaking encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891), has always viewed the supremacy of the 
national state and the transnational market over the intermediary space of civil society and 
economy (ultimately upheld by the Church) as contrary to the Christian faith.20 
In contemporary parlance, the Christian origin and outlook of the post-1919 world order is 
based on the idea of ‘networking’ and ‘mainstreaming’ Christian ideas and thus multiplying 
the power of European’s vestigially Christian polity. The invention of international 
organisations and supranational bodies reflects the Christian commitment to create a 
cosmopolis – a cosmic city that upholds universal, global principles embodied in particular, 
national or regional practices. Arguably, Christianity – whose global spread outstrips that of 
Islam and other world religions21 –  is the force multiplier of Europe. Without embracing its 




Over the past fifty years or so, European economic integration has stimulated political 
unification and social convergence between divided and structurally different countries. It 
has also sustained the quest for an institutional structure that can balance the interest of its 
now 27 members in the wider European space while at the same time supporting the EU’s 
aspiration to become a global actor on the world stage. However, the 1957 Rome Treaty 
enshrined a functionalist logic that establishes the primacy of economic exchange and legal 
harmonisation over shared political ideas and common cultural practices. Over time, this has 
reinforced the modern ‘disembedding’ of the economic sphere from the social order and a re-
embedding of the social in the economic. In the case of Europe, this is exemplified by the 
construction of a single, bureaucratically regulated market that has taken precedence over 
social solidarity and environmental sustainability. 
Linked to the priority of the economic over the social is a tendency to subordinate the dignity 
of the human person and interpersonal relationships to the central state and the ‘free’ market 
that collude at the expense of the intermediary institutions of civil society. The European 
‘market-state’ has undermined Europe’s shared cultural identity that Christianity helped                                                         
20 Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
21 Philip Jenkins, The next Christendom: the coming of global Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
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forge. That, in turn, has hollowed out the universal values derived from the Christian 
synthesis of ancient and biblical virtues on which both vibrant democracies and market 
economies depend. At the same time, Europe remains a vestigially Christian polity that has 
the potential to be a commonwealth of nations and peoples, which is held together by cultural 
customs, social ties and indeed religious practices. 
The chapter has contrasted the secular ‘market-state’ with the Christian commonwealth. My 
argument is that Europe’s Christian heritage is a source of both social solidarity and religious 
pluralism that offers key resources to shape the future of the European polity. Indeed, 
contemporary Europe remains a vestigially Christian polity that is to a large extent governed 
by the Catholic principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. This is true of the European Union 
that is neither a federal super-state in the making nor a glorified free-trade area but rather a 
neo-medieval empire, which pools national sovereignty and views states more like ‘super-
regions’ in a wider subsidiary association of nations and peoples. In such a polity with 
overlapping jurisdictions and multiple levels of membership, states are key because they 
balance the rightful claims of localities and regions with the rightful claims of Europe as a 
whole.  
Instead of harking back to bureaucratic statism or market liberalism, the 27 member-states 
and their partner countries in the wider European space such as Russia, Ukraine and Turkey 
should all retrieve the older and more genuinely European tradition of subsidiary federalism 
or federal subsidiarity – a distribution of competencies between the Community institutions 
and the member-states in accordance with the principles of a federal rather than a unitary 
political system, coupled with a radical programme of decentralisation to the most appropriate 
level (including regions, localities, communities and neighbourhoods) and a greater sense that 
European nations are indeed like ‘super-regions’ within a wider transnational polity. 
In an increasingly post-ideological politics characterised by professed pragmatism, there is a 
void of fresh ideas and policies – a situation that bears great dangers.22 In conjunction with a 
Europe of localities that promotes political participation and civic structures, mutual political 
practices across the Union could help foster a shared identity. Subsidiary federalism, coupled 
with a greater emphasis on constitutional corporatism, blends some of Europe’s best traditions 
which would transform her constituent nations in mutually beneficial ways. Paradoxically, a 
Europe that applies the principles of mutuality, reciprocity and solidarity will speak to its 
local needs and global responsibility – to ‘function as a "leaven" for the entire world’, as Pope 
Benedict XVI said on the fiftieth anniversary of the Rome Treaty.                                                         
22 See, supra, note 13. 
